Transparency is recognised to be a key underpinning of the work of health technology assessment (HTA) agencies, yet it has only recently become a subject of systematic inquiry. We contribute to this research field by considering the Polish Agency for Health Technology Assessment (AHTAPol). We situate the 
Introduction
In their daily operations, health technology assessment (HTA) bodies make decisions or recommendations involving patients' lives and large sums of public money. Given the many interests this inevitably attracts, and the global trends towards evidence-based policy-making and good governance, it is unsurprising that transparency has been a long established principle of good practice in HTA . Notably, it is part of the mission and value statement of the European Union network for Health Technology Assessment (EUnetHTA 2017), and has been put forward as a solution to the less-than-perfect utilisation of HTA by decision-makers (Sorenson, Drummond, and Kanavos 2008) or the low acceptance of its outputs by the public and stakeholders (Panteli et al. 2015) .
Recommendations to increase transparency are commonplace (Hailey 2003 ), but systematic evaluations of the levels of transparency achieved by individual HTA agencies in practice have been relatively rare thus far (Inotai et al. 2012) , with a recent comparison of availability of information in formal decision-making frameworks in 36 countries is a rare exception (Panteli et al. 2015) .
To address this gap in research, we analyse the level of transparency of HTA in Poland and compare it to the transparency of the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) in England. While NICE is commonly accepted as the gold standard in transparency of HTA procedures (del Llano-Señarís 2015 , Meneu 2015 , the importance of transparency was initially slow to be recognised in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) (Kolasa et al. 2012) . The Polish Agency for Health Technology Assessment (AHTAPol), despite its status as a leader in HTA in CEE (Löblová 2016) , did not mention transparency explicitly in its early methodological guidelines (AHTAPol 2007 (AHTAPol , 2009 . Only the latest guidelines place it at the heart of the definition of HTA as a contribution to evidence-based policymaking (AHTAPol 2016).
Previous research on transparency in HTA in Poland has emphasised two aspects, as described by Meneu (Meneu 2015) . These are "transparency of HTA bodies and of HTA decisions". In the first case, transparency of HTA bodies, the very operation of the appraisal body, the Transparency Council, has been a major improvement in the area of transparency (Kolasa et al. 2011a ). Nevertheless, the AHTAPol has faced challenges in ensuring the transparency of its relationships with key stakeholders in the drug evaluation process, especially policymakers (Nizankowski and Wilk 2009 ) and drug manufacturers (Ozieranski, McKee, and King 2012, Kolasa et al. 2011b) , although, of course, these problems are not unique to Poland. Similar findings have been reported in other EU countries, especially in CEE (Gulácsi et al. 2014 , Franken, Le Polain, et al. 2012 ).
In the second case, transparency of HTA decisions, research has concentrated on AHTAPol's recommendations and their relatively weak relationship with the final reimbursement decisions Malinowski 2016, Kolasa, Dziomdziora, and Fajutrao 2011) . The AHTAPol also faced complaints that, although its recommendations were publicly available, extensive redactions often made it impossible to understand their content (Plisko n.d.) . This has, however, changed and a recent study concluded that the introduction of a policy to clarify procedures for disclosing information had enabled the AHTAPol to be more assertive when responding to manufacturers' requests to redact information considered as "commercially sensitive" (Bochenek et al. 2016) . This was associated with a marked increase in transparency of AHTAPol's recommendations. Similar initiatives have been implemented in other European countries (Inotai et al. 2012 , Kolasa et al. 2012 ). With few exceptions, there has been less interest in studying the transparency of the earlier, "assessment" part of the HTA process and its outputs (Kolasa et al. 2011a ). Our study is a step toward addressing this gap.
We focus on "verification analyses" (VAs) produced by the AHTAPol. These are assessments of evidence compiled by drug manufacturers that play a key role in developing HTA recommendations. By using existing evidence compiled by the manufacturers, they seek to obviate the need for new analyses. They can thus be considered as a "light" approach to HTA, equivalent to Evidence Review Group (ERG) reports within the Single Technology Appraisal (STA) undertaken by the NICE (Kaltenthaler et al. 2011) .
Because the data for analysis is presented by stakeholders with a clear business interest in its outcome, it is essential to ensure that the HTA assessment is rigorous, avoiding the risk of becoming a "black box" (Sandman and Gustavsson 2016) . There are several reasons. First, all decisions with major public health and budgetary consequences should be open to scrutiny to ensure democratic legitimacy (Landwehr and Böhm 2014) . Second, a transparent process supports stakeholder involvement, enabling all interested parties to submit meaningful comments on emerging decisions (Panteli et al. 2015) .
Building on Meneu's typology (Meneu 2015) and Garrido et al's earlier conceptual work on HTA (Velasco Garrido, Zentner, and Busse 2008), we evaluate, first, the transparency of the process of developing VAs, including rationales for withholding information from the public, information on authors and contributors, timelines, and types of evidence considered. Second, we evaluate the transparency of HTA outputs, or the key conclusions from the evaluation of the medical technology submitted for approval for state reimbursement, including clinical effectiveness, safety, cost-effectiveness and budgetary impact. We present our analytical approach in Table 1. [ Table 1 about here]
We evaluate the availability of information on each dimension of transparency using three criteria:
 Is there an explicit framework for the provision of the relevant information (e.g. a table or a section in VAs)?
 Is the information actually included within this framework?
 Is the information visible or redacted? Accordingly, for information to be fully transparent it must meet all three criteria, i.e. be included in an explicit framework and visible.
We assess whether and how transparency of Polish HTA has changed over time.
Following recent research findings highlighting the positive impact of the new official guidance on the transparency of ATHAPol's recommendations we expect to see a similar gradual improvement in relation to VAs (Bochenek et al. 2016) .
We also conduct an exploratory analysis of a sample of NICE's ERG reports and compare the levels of AHTAPol's transparency with that of NICE. Here we expect to identify areas where Polish HTA lags behind NICE's operations.
This article proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss regulatory frameworks that the AHTAPol and NICE use in developing their assessment reports. Next, we describe our methodology. Following this, we present our evaluation of AHTAPol's VAs and NICE's ERG reports. Finally, we set our findings in a broader policy context and formulate policy recommendations.
Background
Poland's reimbursement legislation, enacted as the Law on Health Care Services Financed from Public Sources (2004) and the Reimbursement Act (2011) , and further specified by Ministerial ordinances (Minister of Health 2012), stipulates that every application for reimbursement of a medicine for a particular indication must be supported by a set of HTA analyses, covering clinical, economic, budgetary impact and rationalisation issues (the last comprising measures to mitigate any additional budgetary expenditure). The manufacturer submits these analyses, typically compiled by consultancy firms, to the Ministry of Health (MoH), which is then supposed to pass them "without any undue delay" to the AHTAPol. Once received, AHTAPol's analysts develop a VA, which is then While the ATHAPol receives core public funding, the cost of developing a VA is covered by the manufacturer, with the upper limit of 150,000 PLN (£30,000).
The Minister has 180 days to reach a decision on a new reimbursement application, including 60 days during which the AHTAPol President must reach a recommendation after receiving the reimbursement application from the MoH.
The transparency of VAs is subject to several regulations that may, in some circumstances, conflict. The AHTAPol has a duty, introduced by the reimbursement legislation, to make VAs publicly available on the Internet, together with the corresponding manufacturers' HTA analyses and any comments on VAs, including, for example, clarifications by the manufacturer.
Publication should take place at least eight days before the corresponding TC session (AHTAPol 2015) . However, the AHTAPol is also subject to the Law on Unfair Competition (1993) , which states that revealing an enterprise's "commercial secrets" constitutes unfair competition. The Law on Protection of Personal Information (1997) also requires that processing personal data, including its publication, must be consensual and "necessary" for meeting legal obligations of an institution or advancing the public interest.
The AHTAPol has gradually clarified these conflicting regulatory requirements in relation to VAs (Bochenek et al. 2016 ). An initial Communication emphasised that the transparency of public information may only be limited in exceptional circumstances and demanded that manufacturers' requests for redacting information from VAs be clearly justified with respect to its "economic value" The only pieces of information that the AHTAPol would redact on its own initiative would be those "directly" concerning risk-sharing instruments and prices proposed by drug manufacturers, an important innovation brought in by the Reimbursement Act, seeking to manage the budgetary impact and prices of new medicines by relating them to their health effects or volume of sales . By contrast, the AHTAPol would publish all other information, in particular, data on clinical effectiveness, safety, costeffectiveness, budgetary impact and reimbursement arrangements in other countries. Most of these measures were broadly supported by HTA consultants (Jakubiak 2014) , with more scepticism shown by the industry, highlighting the need for further refinement (INFARMA and IGFP 2014) .
As already noted, the AHTAPol's drug appraisals are broadly similar to NICE's STA, first undertaken in 2005 (Kaltenthaler et al. 2011) . Like the AHTAPol's HTA process, STAs concern mostly new technologies for a single indication based primarily on clinical and economic evidence submitted by manufacturers. In contrast to the AHTAPol, NICE outsources the development of assessment reports to Evidence Review Groups (ERGs), independent external academic centres (NICE 2017) . While in STAs the appraisal phase is also led by senior health experts, it puts greater emphasis on consultation with patients, clinicians and the industry (NICE 2014) . Another difference between them is that NICE provides only indicative timelines for various stages of the STA process, including the development of ERG reports (NICE 2009). Finally, unlike AHTAPol's advisory recommendations, those developed by NICE must be implemented by health commissioners within a specified period.
NICE considers public availability of evidence a vital form of transparency (NICE 2014) . In addition to the types of documents published by the AHTAPol, NICE also publishes, in their entirety, comments that its consultees provide to the Appraisal Committee. However, neither organisation publishes expert opinions that inform the development of assessment reports. NICE only accepts redacted information "in exceptional circumstances". First, like the ATHAPol it recognises that some evidence may be "commercial in confidence", with potentially "a significant impact on the commercial interests of a particular company". Second, unlike the AHTAPol, NICE uses the category of information "academic in confidence", with potential implications for "the ability of the data owner to publish the information in a scientific paper" (NICE 2014 
Materials and methods
We considered all VAs developed in response to MoH requests to examine Given NICE's uncontested status as "the most transparent of all agencies" (LlanoSeñarís 2015), we did not analyse all ERG reports commissioned by NICE. We constructed, instead, a stratified sample to serve as a "best-in-class" benchmark.
To ensure comparability with the AHTAPol, our sampling frame included all ERG reports linked to guidance on medicinal technologies developed within the STA process from 2012 to 2015. As Table 2 demonstrates, within each year we randomly selected, using Excel, 25 per cent of the total number of issued ERG reports. These reports represent 9 out of 17 NICE's condition and disease categories in which we identified relevant guidance. These are blood and immune system conditions (2 reports analysed), cancer (7), cardiovascular (4), diabetes (1), digestive (2), eye (2), musculoskeletal (1), respiratory (2), and skin conditions (1).
[ Table 2 about here]
We examined VAs and ERG reports using quantitative content analysis. A detailed coding framework, covering the two main dimensions of transparency, was derived based on an exploratory analysis of 8 VAs from different years (PO), and applied to VAs (NN) and ERG reports (PO). We resolved any issues in interpreting the data and applying the coding framework during the coding process and upon its completion we verified its accuracy using a sample of 16
VAs issued at various points in each year (PO). No inconsistencies were spotted.
The results of analysis and its interpretation were discussed within the research team.
In investigating the transparency of HTA outputs, we focused on concluding sections of VAs and summary sections of ERG reports given their similar length.
However, as the concluding sections in VAs typically covered at least twice as many topics as ERG reports, when making comparisons we concentrated on sections on clinical and cost-effectiveness. To examine the transparency of the HTA process we considered introductory sections of VAs and ERG reports, while at the same time recognising that especially in the case of VAs, some sections had been removed, renamed or merged with other sections. When looking for information on contributions by external medical experts, and their conflicts of interests, we searched through the entire assessment reports using the search terms "eksper" and "konflikt" (VAs) and "advice", "opinion", "expert" (ERG reports). Given the small sample size, rather than examining changes in the transparency of ERG reports over time we merely sought to identify key similarities and differences with VAs.
For the sake of clarity, we identify VAs using the numbers of MoH requests, while for ERG reports we use appraisal numbers.
Findings
We begin this section by evaluating changes in the transparency of the HTA process and outputs in the light of AHTAPol's VAs. We then compare these findings with exploratory analysis of NICE's ERG reports. In the latter case, however, the categories of people or other commercial entities were not specified; presumably the AHTAPol referred to HTA consulting firms preparing the analyses on behalf of the manufacturers. The distinction between the two categories of exclusions was supposed to be reflected by using different colours in the main body of the VA but this was never applied in practice in this period.
Starting from VA 53/2013, and then consistently from VA 104/2013, the AHTAPol reformulated the reasons for withdrawing information as "protection of commercial secrets of the commercial entity" and "protection of privacy of physical persons", tying them to specific legal grounds, namely the Law on Unfair While VAs stated that the AHTAPol undertook redactions, they did not provide details of the decision-making process, including who could make such requests, how they were processed, on what criteria they were based, and who decided.
Authors and contributors
All VAs since 2012 included a section that could list AHTAPol employees, external clinical experts and other contributors involved in, for example, analysing epidemiologic, clinical economic data or risk-sharing instruments (e.g. 86/2012). This section was gradually withdrawn throughout 2013 and disappeared completely in subsequent years. Nevertheless, even when it was included, names of all AHTAPol employees and external experts were always redacted, and only in one case another contributor, a medical specialty organisation, was named (29/2012).
Verification analysis timeline
All VAs reported when they were completed. However, as shown in Table 3 [ Table 3 about here]
An even smaller, and declining, percentage of VAs provided both the date of receiving the reimbursement application from the MoH and the statutory deadline for returning the recommendation of the AHTAPol President to the MoH, following the completion of the VA. Among this group, only four stated that the deadline was 60 days, the statutory figure. In all other instances it was considerably longer. While there is a proviso that the statutory deadline can be extended, no explanations were provided for any extensions. [ Table 4 about here]
Subject of reimbursement application

Manufacturers' HTA analyses
Only with one exception (139/2014) all VAs had a section to note the receipt of the four types of HTA analyses (decisional, economic, budget impact and rationalisation) that had to support reimbursement applications. Over time there was a decline in the share of VAs reporting the receipt of all HTA analyses, from 41 per cent in 2012 to 34 per cent in 2015. In eight cases before 2015, the relevant section was included but information on the receipt of all HTA analyses was redacted. There was, however, a slight increase in the share of HTA analyses whose titles and organisational authors were visible (from 26 to 30 per cent and from 3 to 14 per cent, respectively).
Expert opinions
As Table 5 [ Table 5 about here]
The removal of the table listing contributors had a negative impact on the transparency of data on expert opinions. As Table 6 The inconsistency between the number of experts approached and providing opinions was, in some instances, explained by referring to experts' failure to respond to AHTAPol's request but in others it was not commented on. Further, inconsistencies between the number of opinions received and included in VAs can, only to a small extent, be explained by information on experts' conflicts of interest. While there was an increase in the share of VAs in which some expert opinions were excluded (from 13.1 per cent in 2012 to 40.5 per cent in 2015), the share of VAs attributing exclusions explicitly to conflicts of interest was markedly lower (1.6 per cent in 2012 and 11.6 per cent in 2015). Even in these instances, however, the occurrence of conflicts of interests was merely acknowledged, with no further details provided. The remaining reasons for excluding expert opinions were not accounted for.
The VAs did not provide any information on the rules for approaching experts, and possible exclusions of expert opinions. Only VAs 75 and 76/2015 reported that it was the President that made decisions as to whether expert opinions with conflicts of interest could be accepted. [ Table 7 about here] 2 AHTAPol: Transparency of HTA outputs
Transparency of verification analysis conclusions
Each VA had a section summarising its conclusions. As presented in Table 8, [ Table 8 about here]
NICE: Transparency of HTA process and outputs
Starting with the transparency of the HTA process, although some ERG reports mention the two main rationales for redacting information, "commercial in confidence" and "academic in confidence" in their initial section, this was not the case in the analysed sample. The appearance of some of the ERG reports suggests that these principles had been applied in the form of different colours at earlier stages of the STA process and are then replaced with uniform black colour before publication.
All ERG reports provided a list of authors, and all but one detailed their tasks.
Contributors, including external clinical experts, were mentioned in the acknowledgements section. In two cases, we found redactions applied to organisational affiliations. With one exception ERG reports had a section to include any conflicts of interest reported by authors. Any contributor conflicts of interests were either included in the section mentioned above or linked with acknowledgements. In both cases, specific conflicts of interest were mentioned.
However, the absence of a separate conflict of interest section for contributors could create ambiguity.
All but one ERG reports stated a date of completion. In two cases, this was a monthly, rather than a daily date. The ERG reports did not state when they commenced, providing instead a project number.
All ERG reports stated the name of the drug, its indication and characterised the target patient population. As any special reimbursement arrangements, called patient access schemes, could be negotiated between the manufacturer and the Department of Health during later stages of the STA process, they were mentioned in the final guidance documents. The guidance described the general nature of these arrangements without revealing the size of discounts from the official list price (which was publicly available).
All ERG reports characterised the manufacturer's submission in the summary chapters, with the company always being listed as the author. Nevertheless, only in five instances the manufacturer's submission was included in the reference list.
As mentioned above, ERG reports did not have a separate section to list clinical experts, nor did they state how many experts had been approached. In four cases, authors were mentioned as sources of expert advice. Nevertheless in 14 cases clinical experts were included in the "contributor" category, sometimes together with, for example, people providing other forms of support. In two cases, both authors and contributors were listed as sources of clinical advice.
ERG reports did not have a separate section summarising expert opinions.
Rather, the opinions were summarised in text in relation to specific issue, potentially obscuring any divergence of opinions between experts. Although opinions were never attributed to specific individuals in some reports with only one expert it was possible to establish their identity. Notably, in two cases even though the expert advice had been provided it did not seem to be included in the main body of the report.
Regarding the transparency of HTA outputs, 15 out of 22 ERG reports had no redactions in the summary section, as demonstrated in Table 9 . While the number of reports affected by redactions appeared to be increasing over time this finding must be taken with scepticism given the small sample size.
[ Table 9 about here]
Conclusions and discussion
To assess the extent to which the normative ideal of transparency of HTA is achieved in the real world, we conducted a comprehensive analysis of the HTA process and outputs in Poland since 2012, and compared it to the gold standard of transparency, NICE, as exemplified by its STA process. Our analysis suggests that, overall, the AHTAPol meets or outperforms NICE's transparency levels in several areas. However, there are also points where AHTAPol's transparency lies behind NICE's, and areas where both agencies could improve.
The AHTAPol seems to have reached the standards set out by NICE in More broadly, the challenges to transparency identified in AHTAPol's VAs, and to some extent in NICE's STA process, highlight two major concerns, familiar to students of delegation of authority to non-majoritarian institutions: the risk of their capture by private interests, and the uncertainty about the quality and efficiency of their work (Pollitt et al. 2001 , Bendor, Glazer, and Hammond 2001 , Thatcher 2002 . To prevent risks and suspicions of regulatory capture, HTA bodies (including NICE and the AHTAPol) introduce rules on conflicts of interest.
Even the most stringent of these rules, however, lose their function as an Poland (Ozieranski, McKee, and King 2012) . Our findings regarding the insufficient reporting of HTA timelines by AHTAPol indicate a potential area for exercising pressure from ministerial decision-makers to expedite appraisals.
Our study has two main limitations. One is the use of only a stratified sample of NICE's ERG reports. While a full analysis of ERG reports was not deemed necessary because of NICE's established status as golden standard in transparency of HTA, our stratified sample suggests full examination by future researchers might be warranted. Another limitation in our examination of HTA outputs is that it did not quantify the extent of redactions and rate the extent to which they may affect our understanding of the key conclusions (Bochenek et al. 2016 ). Nevertheless, even without using these techniques it was possible to investigate what transparency of HTA means in practice, as well as to test our key expectation regarding its improvement over time. Therefore, we contributed to the growing knowledge of Polish HTA, an important learning case for other middle-income countries, especially in the CEE region, which are in the process of establishing their HTA systems (e.g. Bulgaria or Romania). We also added to the emerging literature on comparative transparency of HTA by developing easily interpretable comparisons with NICE and pointing to areas for improvement for both bodies.
Recommendations
Our findings allow for formulating several policy recommendations for the AHTAPol.
1. Increase the clarity of decisions regarding the selective application of redactions to, for example, expert names or contributions. Tables   Table 1 Framework Note. Given changes in the format of verification analyses the denominator for calculating the percentages in the table was the number of verification analyses with a particular section, and not the total number of verification analyses in a given year.
